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ABSTRACT
We investigate the relationship between inter-jurisdictional cooperation and law
enforcement in Mexico. Exploiting a Regression Discontinuity Design in close
municipal elections, we study how improved opportunities for cooperation in
crime prevention among neighboring municipalities - proxied by their degree
of political alignment - may result in lower rates of violent crime. We find
that municipalities in which the party in power in the majority of neighboring
jurisdictions barely won experience significantly lower homicide rates during
the mayor’s mandate than those in which it barely lost. This effect is sizeable
and independent of which party is in power in the neighboring municipalities.
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«[Mexican] municipal police forces...are also among the least effective:
the patchwork of command muddles operations.
In Monterrey the metropolitan area alone has eleven different forces,
using different training, tactics and even brands of radio.
“If a criminal crosses the street he has reached a safe haven,” admits one official»
The Economist, October 14th 2010
1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on federalism has traditionally focused on the fundamental trade-off between
the capacity of a decentralized system to tailor policies to local preferences, and that of
a centralized one to properly internalize inter-jurisdictional spillovers (Oates, 1977, 1999;
Gonzalez-Navarro, 2008; Knight, 2011).1
One aspect that could potentially alter the terms of this trade-off concerns the possible
synergies from horizontal inter-jurisdictional cooperation, that is, between jurisdictions of
the same administrative level. When spatial spillovers are present, systematic cooperation
among local authorities can make local provision of public goods more effective, whereas
the lack of it can exacerbate the inefficiencies associated with decentralization.
One area in which this aspect is particularly relevant is law enforcement: in the context
of a fragmented public security system, better coordination and information sharing among
local police forces can favor effective crime reduction efforts. Indeed, the potential benefit
from inter-jurisdictional cooperation, and the implications for the efficient organization of the
administration of justice, have been extensively discussed in both the criminal justice and the
public administration literature (McDavid, 1974; Ostrom et al., 1978; Parks, 2009), but have
been largely disregarded by economists. One noticeable exception is represented by Loeper’s
recent theoretical contribution on inter-jurisdictional coordination in federal systems (2011).
1 For a thorough discussion of alternative models of federalism, of the concept of federal governance and its
relation with economic performance see respectively Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) and Inman (2007).
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2In this paper we investigate the relationship between horizontal inter-jurisdictional cooper-
ation and the effectiveness of law enforcement in the context of Mexico, where crime inci-
dence has steadily increased over the past decade, and an animated debate about the need
for better coordination among local police forces is ongoing. In particular, we apply a Re-
gression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in close local electoral races to study how improved
cooperation among neighboring municipalities, proxied by the degree of political alignment
between mayors, can improve crime deterrence and result in lower crime rates, with particu-
lar regard to homicides.3 Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that, if random
factors - e.g. unexpected breaking news, weather conditions on election day, etc. - have
an (even small) impact on electoral outcomes, the victory of the candidate of the party that
controls the majority of neighboring municipalities would mimic random assignment in elec-
tions decided by a narrow margin. Such RDD set-up therefore delivers a (local) source of
exogenous variation in political alignment with neighbors, which, we argue, should facilitate
cooperation in law enforcement.
Using this approach, we find that municipalities where the candidate of the party in power in
the majority of neighboring municipalities won by a small margin experienced significantly
lower homicide rates during that mayor’s mandate than comparable municipalities in which
that party barely lost. The effect is sizeable - a decrease in homicide rates of 35 to 43% - and
appears to be independent of which party is in power in the neighboring municipalities. Re-
assuringly, political alignment with neighbors does not appear to be correlated with a variety
of other outcomes, including crime incidence before the election. That improved horizontal
cooperation is driving this result, is further supported by the fact that the documented re-
duction in crime is increasing in the share of same-party neighbors, and is not explained by
2 While Loeper’s argument refers to the case of a pure coordination game and focuses on the external cost
for a jurisdiction to choose a policy different from that chosen by others, his framework does not allow for
actual cooperation and does not take into account the spatial dimension of it, that is, that cooperation with
neighbors may be more valuable than cooperation with non-neighbors.
3 The underlying assumption, discussed below, is that it is easier to achieve cooperation between mayors of
the same party than between mayors of competing parties.
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political alignment with state or federal authorities.
Our paper relates to various streams of literature. First and foremost, our work contributes
to the literature on decentralization in federal systems by providing novel evidence that, in
the presence of geographical spillovers, inter-jurisdictional cooperation can result in more
effective provision of local public good. Although our findings are specific to the area of law
enforcement and public security, we believe that some of the insights from our analysis can
apply to other areas of public policy involving inter-jurisdictional spillovers.
Our contribution is also related to the literature on the role of coordination in the implemen-
tation of crime-reducing policies: while previous contributions have focused on coordina-
tion between local and federal police (Dell, 2011), or between different police forces at the
federal level (Soares and Viveiros, 2010), we focus on horizontal coordination between local
police forces operating in geographically distinct locations, an aspect which economists have
largely disregarded or examined only indirectly (Wheaton, 2006).
Our work also relates to previous studies on the importance of political alignment (Dell,
2011; Brollo and Nannicini, 2011); while these contributions focus on the impact of political
alignment between local and central authorities - on drug-related crime deterrence in Mexico
and on federal transfers to municipal government in Brazil respectively - we look at the effect
of political alignment between jurisdictions of the same administrative level.
Finally, from a methodological perspective, our approach is close to that of other studies that
have used a regression discontinuity design to examine the impact of party affiliation on a
variety of political and non-political outcomes (Lee, 2001; Lee et al., 2004b; Dal Bó et al.,
2009; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background infor-
mation on the Mexican political and institutional system. Section 3 describes the data used
in the empirical analysis. Section 4 illustrates the empirical strategy and presents the main
findings which are further discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2. BACKGROUND ON MEXICO
The Mexican context is particularly well-suited for an empirical analysis of the impact of
cooperation among local police forces on crime for a variety of reasons. Homicide rates in
Mexico have sharply increased in recent years. As displayed in Figure 1 - which shows the
evolution of the number of monthly homicides recorded in the country since 2000 - while
until 2006 the incidence of homicides remained relatively constant (around 1,000/month),
since 2007 the number of homicides has steadily increased, reaching more than 2,000/month
by the end of 2010. This unprecedented surge in violent crime in Mexico has made the object
of a growing literature in social sciences to which this paper attempts to contribute.
Most observers view the increase in homicides as a direct consequence of the federal govern-
ment’s strategy against drug-related organized crime, which has been primarily focused on
neutralizing drug cartel leaders, resulting in increased violent conflict among smaller gangs
for the control of the territory (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2010; Dell, 2011). This paper does not at-
tempt to identify the causes of the observed increase in violent crime but, rather, to shed light
on whether better coordination among local polices can be instrumental to its containment.
Indeed, poor coordination can be especially problematic in the context of Mexico’s highly
fragmented security apparatus,4 in which the investigation and prosecution of homicides is
the responsibility of local police forces. We focus, in particular, on the role of municipal
police which accounts for about 40% of Mexican total law enforcement officers.(Guerrero-
Gutiérrez, 2010) Each municipal police department operates under the direct control of the
municipality government. The mayor - who is elected every three years - has considerable
influence over the selection of local police chiefs and, more in general, over the organization
of the police department. Indeed, the mayor’s party affiliation can have a considerable impact
4 Sabet (2012) estimates that there are about 3,000 different police forces at the municipal, state and federal
level in Mexico.
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on the functioning, priorities, and policing style of municipal forces.5 More important, in the
context of Mexico’s highly polarized political landscape, heterogeneity in party-affiliation
between mayors of neighboring municipalities can aggravate the lack of inter-jurisdictional
cooperation and has, in some instances, even resulted in actual confrontations between dif-
ferent local police forces (Davis, 2006; Tapia, 2009a,b).
It is hence not surprising that an animated debate on the opportunity of reforming the current
organization of Mexican police has emerged among Mexican policy-makers, including at
the highest level. In October 2010, for example, the then President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa
proposed a bill for the creation of a Single-Command National Police Force,6 motivated by
the need to foster coordination and increase homogeneity in the operation of local police
forces. 7 With a similar motivation, since 2011 the National Conference of Mexican Gov-
ernors (CONAGO, a periodic summit of Mexican State governors) has implemented regular
cooperative efforts aimed at reinforcing information sharing among local police forces en-
gaged in operations against crime.8 While these initiatives have not yet been rigorously
evaluated, they indicate that local authorities recognize the need for better coordination as an
instrument to combat crime in a more effective way.
Recent academic contributions on violence in Mexico have also discussed the importance of
cooperation among police forces. In particular, Dell (2011) presents evidence on the impact
5 A curios example of how the mayor’s party affiliation can impact even the most basic aspects of local police
organization - such as equipment purchases - is reported by Sabet (2012): “PAN administrations argue that
police the world over wear blue uniforms and therefore issue uniforms and vehicles in blue. However, blue
happens to be the color of the PAN party, and PRI governments have tried to emphasize other colors. When
PRI Hank Rhon came to office in Tijuana in 2004 after fifteen years of PAN rule, he gave the police new
black uniforms, repainted the police cruisers black, and created a new emblem for the police. Hank Rhon
sold the action as symbolic of a new police force that was making a break from the past and reinventing
itself, but the partisan undertone was unmistakable. When the PAN returned to office in 2007, they reversed
the previous administration’s changes, issued new blue uniforms, painted the patrol cars blue, and returned
to the old police emblem. Mexicali’s PAN administration repainted the city’s black-and white cruisers blue
when it came into office in 2007. Hermosillo’s new PRI government, on the other hand, chose to paint the
formerly blue police cars orange, a color they argued is the color of Hermosillo and not of any political
party.”
6 A similar measure has been recently proposed by the new president, Enrique Peña Nieto.
7 Further details on the bill are available at http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/iniciativas-de-ley/
mando-unico-policial/.
8 Further information is available at: www.conago.org.mx.
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of improved coordination between federal and local police on drug-related crime and finds
that improved opportunities for cooperation between local and federal governments (proxied
by the degree of political alignment) result in a higher number of drug-related homicides.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous empirical study has attempted to measure
the impact of improved horizontal cooperation among local police forces.
Before moving to the empirical analysis we provide additional details on the Mexican in-
stitutional and political context. Mexico is a multi-party competitive democracy with three
major political parties disputing most of the positions at stake in local and federal elections:
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party
of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). With regard to the parties’ ideological position, while
PAN is right-to-center and PRD left-to-center, PRI is generally considered as centrist. While
federal and state elections are held every six years, municipal elections are held every three
years with all the municipalities in a state voting at the same time. In both local and federal
elections the three major parties - particularly PRI and PRD - generally form coalitions with
smaller parties, although in the vast majority of these cases, the coalition candidate is drawn
from the major party. It is hence very likely that when the coalition led by one of the ma-
jor parties prevails in two neighboring municipalities, the elected mayors will belong to the
same party.9
The existence of a positive relationship between party alignment and inter-jurisdictional co-
operation is crucial to our approach and is based on the assumption that mayors affiliated
to the same party will be more prone to encourage cooperative behavior by their respective
municipal police departments. This could simply be due to closer personal connections be-
tween fellow party members operating in the same area, or to shared views regarding crime-
reduction strategies and priorities. Party discipline is also likely to play an important role;
indeed, it is important to note that mayors, like all elected officials in Mexico, cannot run for
9 In some (rather uncommon) cases, two of the major parties may join the same electoral coalition. Since
in these instances inferring the party affiliation of the elected mayor (and the degree of political alignment
with neighboring mayors) is rather difficult, we prefer to exclude these cases from our analysis.
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immediate re-election; hence, they have strong incentives to earn the confidence and good
graces of higher level party leaders who influence future nominations and appointments for
higher offices (Sabet, 2012; Guillén López, 2006).
3. DATA
The data used in our empirical analysis come from a variety of sources. Detailed geographic
information on Mexico’s administrative divisions is available from the Mexican Institute for
Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Using these data, we identify for each municipality a
set of neighbors, defined as those municipalities sharing a boundary. Electoral data for the
municipal elections held since 2000 are available from the Mexican Research Center for
Development (CIDAC). As mentioned, Mexican municipalities hold elections every three
years to renew their local authorities. While all municipalities in a state vote in the same
year, municipalities in different states may hold elections in different years. Table 1 reports,
for each state, the election year for which electoral data are used. For each municipality the
data include the total number of votes cast, and those attributed to each party. For every
election we identify the two parties with most votes and compute the gap in vote share
between the winner and the looser. From the outcome of the previous election, we identify
the incumbent’s party affiliation. Figure 2 represents the distribution of the ruling party’s
identity across Mexican municipalities in 2008. While some areas are largely controlled by
a single party, there is considerable spatial heterogeneity in party’s influence both across
and within regions. Using this information, we compute, for each municipality, the share of
neighboring municipalities controlled by each of the three main parties at the time the mayor
took office. 10
As our main outcome of interest we consider the number of homicides in each municipal-
ity in the three years (before and) after the relevant election. Homicide statistics, available
10 While for neighboring municipalities within the same state we consider the party of the mayor elected in the
same electoral cycle, for out-of-state neighbors which did not hold elections in the same year, we consider
the party in power at the time of the election.
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from INEGI, are derived from official administrative records and include the total number of
homicides recorded each year in a municipality between 2000 and 2010 (Figure 1). We com-
bine these data with information on municipalities’ total population in 2005 - also available
from INEGI - to calculate the yearly homicide rate in a municipality defined as the number
of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.
Finally, we also use data on a variety of socio-economic variables at the municipal level
which we include as controls in our regressions. Data on death rate, adult literacy rate,
share of households with access to sewage, electricity, or running water, school attendance
for children aged 6 to 24 are available from the 2005 INEGI population count (Conteo de
Población y Vivienda). Data on infant mortality rate, human development index, and the
share of female politicians are available from the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP).
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables mentioned above separately for the
full set of Mexican municipalities, and for the restricted sample of municipalities used in our
empirical analysis. Some differences in observed means between the restricted sample and
the rest of Mexican municipalities are statistically different from zero. These include: win-
ning party’s and incumbent party’s identity, area, and other socio-economic indicators such
as infant mortality rate, human development index and share of households with no access to
sewage. Although these differences in observables may question the external validity of the
estimates presented below, to the extent to which our empirical strategy correctly exploits
exogenous variation in mayors’ party affiliation, our findings on the relationship between
political alignment across neighbors and the evolution of homicide rates should be valid for
the municipalities in our sample.
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4. EMPIRICS
4.1. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Our empirical analysis aims to investigate whether improved cooperation among Mexican
municipal police forces - proxied by the degree of political alignment of the respective may-
ors - is associated with lower levels of violent crime. One way to test this hypothesis is
by simply comparing homicide rates between municipalities that are politically aligned with
their neighbors and municipalities that are not. However, this procedure is likely to deliver a
biased estimate of the causal impact of political alignment on crime-related outcomes since,
for example, local political preferences may themselves be affected by crime levels. To
isolate the causal impact of political alignment on homicide rates, we employ a regression
discontinuity design (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2009); in particular,
following previous studies on the impact of party identity on various socio-economic out-
comes (Dell, 2011; Lee et al., 2004a), we exploit the arguably exogenous discontinuity in
the identity of the ruling party in a municipality given by its victory in a close election.
Since we are interested in the degree of political alignment between a given municipality
and its neighbors, we look at those municipalities for which at least 50% of the neighboring
municipalities were governed by the same party, and, among these, focus specifically on
those municipalities in which the party governing the majority of neighbors won or lost by a
small margin (5% or less).
Around the discontinuity, our argument goes, municipalities in which the party ruling in
most of the neighbors barely won would experience an exogenous shock in their capacity
of cooperating with neighbors. Figure 3 illustrates the basic intuition behind our identifica-
tion strategy by mean of an example. The figure depicts two municipalities in the state of
Veracruz holding local elections in 2007: Samahil (shaded red area) and Timucuy (shaded
blue area). Both municipalities share a border with five other municipalities, three of which
were governed by the PRI, one by the PAN, and one by a minor party. However, while in
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Timucuy the PAN won over the PRI by a small margin, in Samahil the PAN lost to the PRI
by a similarly small margin. Our identification strategy is based on the comparison of post-
election homicide rates between ex-ante similar municipalities some of which - like Samahil
- became politically aligned with the majority of their neighbors and others - like Timucuy -
that did not.
Figure 4 graphically summarizes our analysis. We take the set of municipalities for which
at least 50% of the neighbors is governed by one party and divide them into 50 bins, each
representing a 0.2-percentage-point difference in vote share between the party governing the
majority of neighbors and its closest competitor (defined as vote spread in the figure). This
variable is positive if the party governing the majority of neighbors won the election in the
municipality and negative if it lost it. We then define a dummy variable indicating whether
the homicide rate recorded in the municipality in the three years after the relevant election
is above the national median, and regress it on all the control variables introduced above.
Finally, we plot the average residual of this regression against the vote spread. As depicted,
while the average homicide rate tend to increase with the vote spread, there is a significant
decrease in the share of municipalities with above-median post-election homicide rate right
at the point in which the vote spread becomes positive, that is, when the party in power in
the majority of neighbors won the election. In line with our identification strategy, this drop
can be interpreted as the causal effect of an increase in political alignment on post-election
homicide rates. In figure 5 we replicate this exercise using as dependent variable the dummy
variable indicating whether the homicide rate was above the national median in the previous
mandate, and find no evidence of a discrete jump at the discontinuity.
To examine this pattern more formally, and to be able to control for other factors that may
affect homicide rates at the local level, we control for a flexible relationship between the vote
spread and the homicide rate, through a non-parametric local linear regression on each side
of the discontinuity, on the sample of municipalities with at least 50% of neighbors governed
by the same party and in which that party won or lost the election by a margin of at most 5%.
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Our empirical specification is then:
Cis = α0 +α1Mwinis +F(Spis)+δX ′is + γs + εis (1)
where subscript is indicates municipality i located in state s; Cis is a dummy variable tak-
ing value one if the homicide rate in the municipality in the three years after the election is
above the national median, or, alternatively, the log of one plus the homicide rate; Mwinis
is a dummy variable taking value one if the party governing 50% or more of i’s neighbors
won the election in municipality i; F(·) is a flexible function of Spis which is the differ-
ence between this party’s vote share and that of its closer competitor; and finally X ′is is a
vector of characteristics of municipality i in state s, including winning party dummies, in-
cumbent dummies, and a variety of socio-economic characteristics. State fixed-effects (γs)
are included in all the regressions discussed below.
For our empirical strategy to correctly estimate the causal effect of political alignment on
homicide rate two key assumption must be satisfied: i) the outcome of interest must vary
smoothly with respect to the margin of victory (or loss) of the party governing most of the
municipality’s neighbors, ii) only the treatment - that party’s victory - must have an effect on
the outcome of interest at the discontinuity (Caughey and Sekhon, 2011).
To shed light on this aspect, in Table 3 we report the differences in means between observa-
tions on each side of the discontinuity for all control variables included in the regressions,
and also present the results of simple regression discontinuity analyses (adjusting a linear
trend on each side of the discontinuity for the relationship between each outcome analyzed
and the vote spread) using each control as dependent variable. The fact that no significant
difference in these characteristics is observed between municipalities in which the party rul-
ing the majority of neighbors barely won or lost the election, is reassuring of the fact that the
municipalities in the two groups were not dissimilar ex ante. As a further robustness check,
in what follows we also replicate the analysis using the homicide rates in the three years
prior to the relevant election as dependent variable, to confirm that the treatment variable is
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not correlated with pre-election crime incidence.
4.2. RESULTS
Given that the distribution of murder rates in our sample is highly skewed (see Figure 6), in
the first part of our analysis we consider as dependent variable a dummy indicating whether
the murder rate in a municipality is above the national median in the three years after the
relevant elections. The results are reported in table 4. In columns 1 and 2 we control for state
fixed effects, winning and incumbent party fixed effects; in columns 3 and 4 we also control
for death rate, total area, population density, adult literacy rate, the fraction of households
with access to sewage, electricity and water, infant mortality rate and human development
index. In columns 5 and 6 we control for school attendance rate for individuals aged 6 to 24,
and for a variable indicating the fraction of local politicians that are women. In columns 1,
3 and 5 we use the optimal bandwidth for the non-parametric estimates on each side of the
discontinuity according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), while in columns 2, 4 and 6
we reduce the optimal bandwidth to half to explore whether the result is sensitive to a more
flexible relationship between the vote spread and the outcome of interest. In all specifications
political alignment with neighbors displays a negative and significant coefficient (1% level).
Furthermore, the coefficient remains very stable when additional controls are included, and
when the bandwidth is reduced. The magnitude of the coefficient ranges between -0.35 and
-0.43, which implies that municipalities that are politically aligned with their neighbors are
35 to 43 percent less likely to experience above-median homicide rates than municipalities
that are not.
To rule out the possibility that political alignment might be related to pre-existing crime
patterns, we replicate the analysis looking, this time, at the effect of political alignment
on homicide rates in the three years prior to the election (Table 5). The results provide
no evidence of a relationship between pre-election homicide rate and post-election political
alignment: in none of the specifications the coefficient of interest is significantly different
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from zero. This confirms that politically aligned municipalities experienced a decrease in
homicide rate only after the party governing the majority of its neighbors had come to power.
The binary nature of the dependent variable used in Table 4 makes it rather hard to interpret
the magnitude of the effect of political alignment on homicide rate. To give a better sense of
this magnitude, and given the highly skewed distribution of the homicide rate in our sample,
in Table 6 we re-estimate equation (1) using the log of one plus the homicide rate after the
election as the dependent variable. In Table 7 we report the analogous results for the three
years prior to the election. Controls in each column are the same included in Tables 4 and
5. Based on the results in Table 6, we estimate that the improved cooperation resulting from
political alignment between a municipality and its neighbors decreases the log of one plus
the homicide rate by 0.73 to 1.05. Given the observed mean in homicide rates (45.4/100,000
inhabitants), these coefficients suggest a reduction in murder rates corresponding to a 52 to
65 percent reduction. Once again, political alignment does not appear to be correlated with
the murder rate recorded in the three years prior to the election: the estimated coefficients in
Table 7 are very close to zero and statistically insignificant.
5. DISCUSSION
The results presented thus far indicate that municipalities that are politically aligned with
their neighbors experience significantly lower murder rates than those that are not. Although
these findings may be explained by better cooperation among local police forces when may-
ors of neighboring municipalities belong to the same party, they are also consistent with
alternative explanations. For instance, the close election of a mayor from a specific party
may have an impact on crime prevention in a municipality for reasons other than better co-
ordination with same-party neighboring mayors, e.g. because crime prevention is a priority
for that party, or because it supports more effective anti-crime policies. Alternatively, if the
party that governs most of a municipality’s neighbors is also in power at the state or federal
level, political alignment with neighbors may in fact reflect improved cooperation of mu-
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nicipal police with state or federal authorities (as suggested by Dell, 2011) rather than with
municipal polices in neighboring jurisdictions.
In this section we present additional evidence of the robustness of our baseline results and test
some of these alternative explanations. In particular, we test whether the effect of political
alignment: (i) is larger the higher the share of neighboring municipalities governed by the
same party (in line with an explanation based on improved inter-jurisdictional cooperation),
(ii) is not contingent on the identity of the party winning the election; (iii) is not contingent
on the identity of the party in power at the state level; and (iv) is not contingent on the fact
that the winning party is the same as the incumbent.
To test these hypotheses, we turn to a parametric estimation, restricting the sample to mu-
nicipalities for which the party governing the majority of neighbors won or lost by a margin
smaller than 5%. Equation (2), below, summarizes our empirical strategy which is based
on testing whether the impact of political alignment varies when the latter is interacted with
other characteristics:
Cis = α0 +α1Mwinis +∑4t=1(α2,tMwin∗Sptis +α3,t(1−Mwin)∗Sptis)+
α4Mwinis ∗Yis +α5Spis ∗Yis ∗Mwinis +α6Spis ∗Yis ∗ (1−Mwinis)+δX ′is + γs + εis
(2)
The notation largely reproduces the one used in equation (1); however, because the specifi-
cation is parametric, we include a fourth order polynomial of the vote spread on each side of
the discontinuity. In addition, Yis denotes each of the variables used to separately test each of
the hypotheses spelled above, namely: (i) the share of neighboring municipalities governed
by the party in power in most of them; (ii) a dummy variable indicating whether the party
governing most of the neighbors is the PAN (in power at the federal level during the period
of interest); (iii) a dummy variable indicating whether the party governing most of the neigh-
bors is also in power at the state level; and (iv) a dummy variable indicating whether the
party governing most of the neighbors is also the incumbent. In this context, the coefficient
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α4 captures whether the effect of the discontinuity on the outcome of interest varies with Yis,
while α5 and α6 account for the possibility that the same outcome varies smoothly, but in
different ways, for municipalities with different Yis.
Table 8 summarizes the results of this section. The first column reports the results for the
baseline regression - including all controls but no interaction with Yis - which represents
our benchmark. The following columns report the results with the interaction terms for the
share of neighboring municipalities governed by the same party (column 2), for the dummy
for PAN ruling most of the neighbors (3), for the dummy for the party ruling most of the
neighbors also controlling the state government (column 4) and for the dummy indicating if
the party ruling most of the neighbors is also the incumbent.
In column 2 both the coefficient on political alignment with neighbors (Mwinis) and the
coefficient on its interaction with the share of neighboring municipalities governed by the
same party are negative and large in magnitude. The sum of both coefficients is significantly
different from zero at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the idea that the election
of a mayor from a given party in a municipality is more likely to boost inter-jurisdictional
cooperation the more of the neighboring mayors belong to that party. In column 3, political
alignment with neighbors displays a negative and significant coefficient similar in magnitude
with the one reported in column 1. However, the interaction between political alignment and
the dummy indicating whether the party governing most of the neighbors is the same as
the one in power at the federal level is not statistically significant. In column 4, political
alignment with neighbors displays a negative coefficient similar in magnitude with the one
reported in column 1; the interaction between political alignment and the dummy indicating
whether the party governing most of the neighbors is the same as the one in power at the
state level is also negative, smaller in magnitude and not statistically different from zero.
These findings suggest that the impact of political alignment with neighbors on crime reduc-
tion is independent from the degree of political alignment with federal or state authorities,
and further support the view that the observed reduction in crime may be attributed to im-
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proved horizontal rather than vertical cooperation. Finally column 5 also rejects the hypoth-
esis that the reduction in homicide rates is driven by the fact that the incumbent party may
be better at combating crime, for example because more experienced.
6. CONCLUSION
To what extent should policy-making be decentralized in a federal system? And what are
the contrasting forces that should be considered when determining the optimal degree of de-
centralization? The academic debate around these crucial questions has been traditionally
dominated by the fundamental trade-off between the necessity to adapt policies to local pref-
erences, and the need to minimize possible inter-jurisdictional externalities (Oates, 1977).
Any evaluation of the performance of a decentralized system, however, should also take into
account how effective inter-jurisdictional cooperation can make the local provision of public
goods more effective and less costly. This aspect, however, has been largely disregarded in
the literature.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by investigating the impact of horizontal inter-jurisdictional
cooperation in one policy area in which this aspect is especially important: law-enforcement.
In particular we look at the context of Mexico and apply a Regression Discontinuity De-
sign (RDD) to examine whether improved opportunities for cooperation in crime prevention
among neighboring municipalities - proxied by their degree of political alignment - facili-
tates crime deterrence and results in lower crime rates. Our empirical strategy exploits the
arguably exogenous discontinuity in the identity of the ruling party in a municipality given
by its victory in a close election. To estimate the causal effect of political alignment, we
compare the evolution of crime rates in municipalities where the party governing most of the
municipality’s neighbors won the election by a small margin to those in which it lost by a
small margin.
We find that municipalities that are politically aligned with their neighbors experience sig-
17
nificantly lower homicide rates in the years following the election. This effect is sizeable -
25 to 40% reduction in murder rates - robust to various specifications and independent from
the identity of the party in power in the neighboring municipalities. Furthermore, political
alignment appears to have no impact on murder rates prior to the election, confirming that
the treatment variable is not correlated with pre-election crime incidence. Finally, our find-
ings do not provide support for alternative explanations based on the importance of political
alignment with the ruling party at the state or federal levels further confirming the importance
of horizontal over vertical cooperation.
Our research contributes to the crime literature by providing novel evidence that the effective-
ness of decentralized law enforcement systems may crucially depend on the degree of inter-
jurisdictional cooperation that can be supported under decentralization. It also contributes
to the broader debate on decentralization by raising awareness that a thorough evaluation
of the costs and benefits of decentralization should not only take into account the potential
inefficiencies due to the presence of geographic spillover effects, but also the potential syn-
ergies from horizontal cooperation. Indeed, if the gains from cooperation are large enough, a
centralized system which might be superior to a non-cooperative decentralized system may
not be preferred to a cooperative decentralized one. Finally, our research provides new in-
sights with regard to the role of political parties in democratic systems by documenting how
party discipline may foster inter-jurisdictional cooperation and mitigate the inefficiencies of
poorly designed decentralized systems.
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Figure 1: Total Monthly Registered Homicides in Mexico (2000-2010)
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Figure 2: Municipalities by Mayor’s Party Affiliation (2008)
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Figure 3: Example of Political Alignment with Neighboring Municipality
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Figure 4: RDD Graphical Analysis
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Figure 5: RDD Graphical Analysis
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Figure 6: Distribution of Municipalities by Homicide Rate
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Table 1: Election Year by State
Election Year State
2006
Aguascalientes, Campeche, Colima, Distrito Federal, 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, México, Morelos, Nuevo León, 
Querétaro, San Luis Potosí,  Sonora, Tabasco
2007
Baja California, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Durango, Michoacán, 
Oaxaca, Puebla Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, 
Yucatán, Zacatecas
2008 Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Guerrero, Jalisco, Nayarit, Quintana Roo
Election Year by State
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Table 4: Non-Parametric (local linear regression) RD Estimates
Optimal* (0.5)Opt Optimal* (0.5)Opt Optimal* (0.5)Opt
-0.374 -0.427 -0.375 -0.389 -0.351 -0.357
[0.119]*** [0.161]*** [0.117]*** [0.159]*** [0.109]*** [0.141]***
Controls A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls B Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls C Yes Yes
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Optimal bandwidth from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009)
Controls A: state-level dummies, incumbent and winning party dummies
Controls B: death rate, area, pop. density, adult literacy rate, % households with access to sewage, electricity and water, IMR, HDI.
Controls C: school attendance rate for children aged 6 to 24, and share of local politicians that are women.
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if homicide rates during mandate > National Median during mandate
Bandwidth
Majority Wins
Table 5: Non-Parametric (local linear regression) RD Estimates
Optimal* (0.5)Opt Optimal* (0.5)Opt Optimal* (0.5)Opt
0.116 0.145 0.108 0.152 0.073 0.11
[0.117] [0.152] [0.109] [0.139] [0.109] [0.142]
Controls A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls B Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls C Yes Yes
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Optimal bandwidth from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009)
Controls A: state-level dummies, incumbent and winning party dummies
Controls B: death rate, area, pop. density, adult literacy rate, % households with access to sewage, electricity and water, IMR, HDI.
Controls C: school attendance rate for children aged 6 to 24, and share of local politicians that are women.
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if homicide rates previous mandate > National Median in previous mandate
Bandwidth
Majority Wins
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Table 6: Non-Parametric (local linear regression) RD Estimates
Optimal* (0.5)Opt Optimal* (0.5)Opt Optimal* (0.5)Opt
-0.730 -1.050 -0.870 -1.210 -0.780 -1.080
[0.407]* [0.563]* [0.388]** [0.566]** [0.371]** [0.527]**
Controls A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls B Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls C Yes Yes
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Optimal bandwidth from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009)
Controls A: state-level dummies, incumbent and winning party dummies
Controls B: death rate, area, pop. density, adult literacy rate, % households with access to sewage, electricity and water, IMR, HDI.
Controls C: school attendance rate for children aged 6 to 24, and share of local politicians that are women.
Bandwidth
Majority Wins
Non-Parametric (local linear regression) RD Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log (1 + homicide rates) during mandate 
Table 7: Non-Parametric (local linear regression) RD Estimates
Optimal* (0.5)Opt Optimal* (0.5)Opt Optimal* (0.5)Opt
0.006 0.16 -0.048 -0.086 -0.083 -0.137
[0.268] [0.351] [0.227] [0.292] [0.252] [0.338]
Controls A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls B Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls C Yes Yes
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Optimal bandwidth from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009)
Controls A: state-level dummies, incumbent and winning party dummies
Controls B: death rate, area, pop. density, adult literacy rate, % households with access to sewage, electricity and water, IMR, HDI.
Controls C: school attendance rate for children aged 6 to 24, and share of local politicians that are women.
Dependent Variable: Log of 1 + homicide rates in previous mandate 
Bandwidth
Majority Wins
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Table 8: OLS Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.618 -0.328 -0.695 -0.55 -0.666
[0.243]** [0.360] [0.243]*** [0.270]** [0.254]***
-0.54
[0.501]
0.13
[0.385]
-0.139
[0.174]
0.033
[0.198]
Fourth Order Polynomial Spreads Y Y Y Y Y
Differential Spread Controls Y Y Y Y
Controls A Y Y Y Y
Controls B Y Y Y Y
Controls C Y Y Y Y
-1.631 -1.247 -1.697 -1.516 -1.724
[1.770] [1.837] [1.805] [1.784] [1.825]
Observations 281 281 281 281 281
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47
Controls A: state-level dummies, incumbent and winning party dummies. Controls B: death rate, area, pop. density, adult literacy
rate, % households with access to sewage, electricity and water, IMR, HDI. Controls C: school attendance rate for children aged 6 to
24, and share of local politicians that are women. Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
OLS Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if homicide rates during mandate > National Median
Majority Wins
Majority Wins*Fraction Majority
Majority Wins if Majority is PAN
Majority Wins if Majority Governs State
Majority Wins if Majority is Incumbent
Constant
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